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Introduction 
State responses to the enduring organic crisis of the post-Soweto era have been 
comprehensively documented in recent studies. (Saul and Gelb, 1981; Wolpe, 1983; 
Moss, 1980; Davies and O'Meara, 1985.) Specifically, this work has served to 
describe state attempts to restructure fundamentally the existing social formation 
and class relations in such a way as to restore political stability and, ultimately, 
to safeguard capitalism in South Africa. The approach, encapsulated in the notion 
of a "Total Strategytt, at its most basic level, envisaged a diffusion of mass 
struggles and an incorporation of specific strata of the oppressed masses into a new 
"historical blocI1, through a limited restructuring of political and ideological 
policies. (Davies et al, 1984: 37) 
The "Total Strategy" reforms, however, proved incapable either of 
containing escalating internal resistance or of placating mounting international 
criticism of apartheid. A deepening economic recession and the inability of 
legislation based on the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions to relieve the virtual 
siege of metropolitan centres have necessitated new initiatives to restore the 
balance of power in favour of the ruling class. The most recent state offensive, 
thus, has been couched in terms of a regional strategy which, as Cobbett et a1 
describe, is "based on an abandonment of the political and territorial premises of 
apartheid, though not necessarily of race or ethnicity, and envisages the eventual 
reincorporation of the bantustans into a single national South African state". 
(Cobbett et al, 1986: 138) 
This, as yet inchoate, policy entails, in addition to a merging and 
cross-cutting of geographical boundaries, an extensive programme of decentralization 
(both administrative and economic), constitutional restructuring, and the 
privatization of functions hitherto performed by the public sector. As Cobbett et 
a1 point out, however, since the approach is in an embryonic state, it is still 
subject to official contestation and debate, and hence to reformulation. 
Nevertheless, elements of the strategy are evident in the restructuring of local 
government (cf the Regional Service Councils), the reordering of labour movement and 
settlement, industrial deconcentration programmes, and, most notably for the 
purposes of this paper, through the activities of the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA). 
This paper will seek to outline the origins and changing functions of the 
DBSA and its role in advancing recent reform initiatives. In that regard, 
discussion will focus on several issues: the current holding operation of the Bank 
in the transition to new constitutional forms; the gradualistic "reintegration" of 
the bantustans into the South African political economy; the functional role of the 
DBSA in reorientating the ideological discourse of the ruling class and the 
promotion of a more depoliticized and technocratic social order. 
The Origins of the DBSA 
The establishment of a development bank for Southern Africa was officially mooted at 
the "Carlton Conferencet1 in November 1979. At that conjuncture, the proposed bank 
was projected as a key element in the "Total Strategy" programme. In particular, it 
was viewed a s  a foca l  point  f o r  the  mobilization of the  resources of the  s t a t e  and 
cap i t a l  i n  r e s i s t i n g  the  I t total  onslaughttt on capitalism. In t h i s  r o l e ,  it would 
f a c i l i t a t e  a programme of accelerated economic development i n  the  region and would 
a c t  a s  an important i n s t i t u t i o n a l  mechanism i n  the establishment of  a ItConstellation 
of Southern African States". 
  he creation of a constel lat ion of s t a t e s  w a s  intended t o  f u l f i l  a number 
of objectives. In addit ion t o  forging an a l l iance  of "moderate states1! (most 
notably Zimbabwe, Malawi, and the  BLS countries)  t o  f o r e s t a l l  the spread of 
ftMarxismbf i n  the region, the conste l la t ion was intended t o  strengthen economic l inks  
(and hence dependency) between South Africa and its neighbours. This was t o  be 
achieved through co-operation i n  jo in t  inf ras t ructura l  projects  and by means of  
f inancia l  a i d  t o  be channelled through a Southern African Development Bank (Davies 
and OtMeara, 1985: 190-97). A s  members, the Constellation would serve a l so  t o  
legitimate the  bantustans in ternat ional ly  by drawing them i n t o  an associat ion with 
independent black s t a t e s .  
The Bank's r o l e  i n  the  Constellation of S ta tes  was not  t o  material ize,  
however. The constel lat ion i n i t i a t i v e  collapsed, f i r s t  with the  defeat  of Muzorewa 
(an assumed adherent of the concept) i n  the  Zimbabwean independence e lec t ions ,  and 
subsequently with the  formation of the  Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADDC) i n  April 1980. SADDC, i n  par t icular ,  defined its pr incipal  
objective a s  a reduction of dependence on South Africa. To t h a t  end, a mul t i la tera l  
development programme was formulated t o  finance much of the  in f ras t ruc tu ra l  
development t h a t  had been envisaged f o r  Bank funding. (Davies and OtMeara, 1985) 
The fa i lu re  t o  r ea l i ze  the  Constellation of Sta tes  not  only slowed the  
momentum t o  es tabl ish  the Bank formally ( i t  only became operationa1,four years a f t e r  
the Carlton Conference) but a l so  necessi tated a s h i f t  i n  its area  of influence. 
Thus, while the a r t i c l e s  of agreement of the  DBSA allow t h a t  membership w i l l  "be 
open t o  other independent s t a t e s  i n  Southern Africagt (DBSA, 1985, Art ic le  2b), the 
area of operation has been re t rac ted  t o  the  so-called Southern African Development 
Area (SADA), const i tu t ing South Africa and the  ten I1dependentft and "independent" 
bantustans. The Nkomati accord and the  coup i n  Lesotho have, i n  the  interim, 
rekindled the hope of in ternat ional  involvement, but nevertheless it "remains the 
policy not t o  press the  extension of the  Bank's a c t i v i t i e s  t o  such s t a t e s  
prematurely ... while waiting f o r  more opportune circumstances i n  which more ac t ive  
co-operation can be pursued (Brand, 1985: 6) .  
Reformulation of Reform 
The f a i l u r e  t o  implement "Total Strategytt reforms a s  i n i t i a l l y  conceived 
necessitated a number of programmatic adjustments i n  S ta te  policy. Most obviously, 
it became apparent t h a t  exis t ing administrative measures t o  contain Black opposition 
were proving inadequate and a l t e rna t ive  formative action was required. During the 
ear ly  1980s, therefore,  a number of major policy s h i f t s  were i n i t i a t e d  under the 
"adapt o r  d iew slogan. These included the new const i tu t ional  dispensation and the 
formulations of the  Good Hope Conference of November 1981. 
The Good Hope Conference marked the  formalization of a regional 
development s t ra tegy f o r  South Africa, f i r s t  proposed i n  the  National Physical 
Development Plan of 1975. More importantly, it s ign i f i ed  a rethink of s t a t e  policy 
vis-a-vis the  bantustans. The i n a b i l i t y  of the  independent bantustans t o  achieve 
anything approaching self-sustaining growth had become increasingly apparent i n  the  
f i v e  years s ince  the  Transkei had a t ta ined its independence. In  addit ion,  the  
changing nature of  the  South African labour market (towards g rea te r  automation) 
placed increasing s t r a i n s  on the  bantustans, which proved incapable of absorbing 
e i the r  new or  retrenched workers. This, i n  turn,  was proving f inanc ia l ly  ( i n  terms 
of a id)  and p o l i t i c a l l y  ( i n  terms of growing urban unemployment) cos t ly  t o  the  
s t a t e .  
The recognition t h a t  the bantustans could function ne i the r  sole ly  a s  
labour reserves nor a s  self-contained s t a t e s  marked a departure from e a r l i e r  
apartheid thinking. The division of South Africa i n t o  e ight  National Development 
Areas (NDAs) spanning regional and homeland boundaries was thus, in effect, a tacit 
acknowledgement that the concept of independent bantustans was unworkable. It is of 
significance, moreover, that the notion of a "confederation of states", tabled at 
the Conference, in actuality opened the possibility of a future progression towards 
a federal, or even a unitary, state. Speaking at a summit meeting of bantustan 
leaders some four months later, P W Botha was to state that confederal agreements 
"need not be restricted to economic matters, but could be applied to every matter of 
mutual interest. The essence is co-operation through consens~s~~ (RSA, 1985: 212). 
The Good Hope proposals envisaged a key role for the DBSA in the 
advancement of regional development. This objective was subsequently enshrined in 
the Bank's articles of agreement (DBSA, 1985 a: 1, ii) and it is continually 
reaffirmed that the DBSA "has the responsibility of promoting and supporting 
projects that will have an optimal impact on balanced regional developmentf1 (DBSA, 
1985 b: 12). However, while the Bank is principally portrayed as the financial 
vehicle of decentralization, it nevertheless serves to perform a number of other 
unofficial functions. Most prominently, it acts to legitimate still existing 
apartheid policies by seeming to distance the state financially and politically from 
the bantustans. This, as will be seen subsequently, entails a number of 
contradictory objectives. 
Towards a Technocratic Order 
Whilst the South African social formation could not be construed to be late 
capitalistic in nature, it is noteworthy that state responses to mass opposition 
increasingly reflect many of the strategies of crisis legitimation documented by 
Habermas (1973) and others in advanced capitalist countries. The maintenance of 
apartheid in the '60s and '70s, for example, necessitated increasing levels of state 
intervention in the social and economic order, which in turn necessitated the 
expansion of bureaucratic structures to fulfil its increasingly diversified roles. 
Not only did this process place considerable strain on the state budget but it 
effectively politicized most spheres of daily life. This, in turn, stimulated ever 
greater demands on the state for popular participation, the provision of services, 
etc, in that "the 'hand of the state1 is more visible and intelligible than the 
'invisible handf of the market". (Held, 1983: 103) 
The state response to this Iflegitimation crisis" has been twofold. In the 
first instance, it has sought to mystify the processes of control by fostering a 
technocratic justification of the social order; practical issues are thus defined 
as technical problems and state policies are depicted as technically rational 
strategies, devoid of substantive political or ideological doctrine. In the second, 
it has promoted a return to a "laissez fairelf economy, a move which lflogically 
entails a diminution of the state; its withdrawal from certain activities, and 
their exposure to the just and more efficient regimen of the market" (Mann, 1986: 
78). Both approaches seek to depoliticize what has come to seem as the "development 
domain" (the socio-economic development of Africans), and both are most clearly 
reflected in the policies and practices of the DBSA. 
Despite indications that current state thinking includes the possibility 
of full or partial reintegration of the bantustans, the glacial momentum (Cobbett et 
al, 1986) of existing apartheid policy is such that it is not easily checked or 
redirected. The DBSA thus finds itself in a contradictory position: not only must 
it pave the way for future constitutional changes (via an accelerated programme of 
regional development) but it must also perform a holding operation, legitimating the 
status quo until such time as more extensive reforms can be effectuated. It does so 
in several ways, by reinforcing the notion of independent bantustans, by diminution 
of the role of the state in the development process, and by projecting its own image 
as an international development bank. 
The rituals of sovereignty and multilateralism have been played out since 
the inception of the Bank, and reference is continually to mu consensus" and 
lvco-operationt* in describing policy directives. The Bank, moreover, is at pains to 
stress that its role is an advisory one "vis-a-vis the governments and official 
development agencies which have the primary responsibility for initiating and 
implementing development projectsH and that it "does not assume the role of these 
entitiesv (DBSA, 1984: 7). The Bank, which is modelled "on the same lines as the 
World Banktt (RSA, 1985: 211), thus endeavours to pursue its undertakings "with due 
attention to considerations of economy, efficiency and the stimulation of domestic 
production and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
 consideration^^^ (DBSA, 1985a: 9e). 
Despite claims that the "DBSA is not involved in politics or 
policy-making, but in the practical aspects of developmenttp (Van der Kooy, 1984: 
4), it is, needless to say, in every respect a political creation. Most obviously, 
it has taken over a major portion of the liabilities and responsibilities of the 
government Corporation for Economic Development (CED), which was hitherto 
responsible (in conjunction with corporations in the homelands) for stimulating and 
financing development in the bantustans. Perhaps more importantly, however, it has 
taken over the funding responsibilities of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
initiating a shift from budget aid to project aid in the form of loans. The 
significance of this shift is that the state is now in a position to claim that the 
independent bantustans are no more dependent than, for example, the BLS countries, 
since they acquire their revenue primarily from Customs Union Compensations and 
from loan capital raised from an autonomous financial institution. 
The Privatization of Development 
A major thrust of the present reform programme, as intimated, has been a move 
towards increased privatization of public sector activities. The appeals of both 
the Carlton and Good Hope conferences were, in particular, for increasing 
private-sector involvement in the development of the bantustans. Hitherto, in 
addition to locational disadvantages, commercial and industrial investment in these 
regions had been constrained, first, by the "border industry" programmes and, 
subsequently, by the rigid controls of the agency system. Development and the 
funding of development, inasmuch as they existed at all, were the sole perogative of 
the state. The new initiative represents an attempt to shift responsibility and, in 
effect, holds the promise that the state could be removed entirely from the "scene 
of the crimeu. The DBSA is seen as instrumental in this process, not only in 
supporting private-sector ventures but also in legitimating the policy as a 
wnaturallt redress of the shortcomings of previous development models: 
Until recently the development of less-developed areas 
in the region tended to be approached in terms of a 
model which made it primarily a government function, 
in contrast to the significant role accorded to 
private initiative in the advanced sectors of the 
Southern African economy. One of the main tasks the 
DBSA has set itself is the mobilization of private 
sector participation in the development process. It 
strives to achieve this through the creation of the 
necessary development infrastructure, by abstaining 
from providing finance if in its opinion such finance 
is available from private sources on terms which are 
reasonable for the recipient ... and by identifying 
opportunities in the less-developed areas for specific 
involvement of private interests. (DBSA, 1985b: 17) 
Not only has the DBSA assumed responsibility for the funding of previously 
concluded loan agreements of the CED and the Department of Foreign Affairs, it is 
increasingly becoming the sole point of financial contact between the bantustans and 
Pretoria. The economic growth of these regions is thus increasingly moderated and 
controlled by technical criteria and ultimately by considerations of whether 
projects ttcan be regarded as 'bankable1 ... in terms of DBSA policy guidelinestt 
(DBSA, 1984: 12). 
With the establishment of a development bank, it was hoped that the 
interests of the state and capital would coalesce. This was especially so in view 
of the fact that fractions of capital had long been agitating for reforms and, in 
particular, an economically more realistic policy with respect to the bantustans. 
It was logical that, in the attempts to forge an alliance with capital, leading 
figures in finance, mining and industry should be appointed to the DBSA board of 
directors. The Council of Governors, the ultimate controlling body, not 
surprisingly remains dominated by present and former ministers of state. At the 
same time, while the initial share capital of the Bank was provided by the state and 
to a lesser extent by the bantustan governments (themselves largely funded by 
Pretoria), it was always the intention that funding would be sought from local and 
foreign capital markets. While it is perhaps too soon to evaluate overtures in that 
direction, it is evident that the Bank is still operating almost exclusively (73%) 
on share capital provided by the South African government. 
At the operational level, the central role of the private sector has 
always been implicit in the Bank's philosophy: 
The private sector should really be the vehicle for 
development and a government should create a climate 
in which the private sector can operate (Van der Kooy, 
1985: 53) 
Thus far, the major orientation of the privatization initiative in the bantustans 
has been towards industrial decentralization. In this, the Bank has merely followed 
development patterns set in motion by the border industries programme and bolstered 
by the declarations of the Good Hope conference. The implementation of the 
industrial decentralization policy has hinged on the disbursement of a costly range 
of incentives to investors, including tax holidays, preferential transport tariffs, 
subsidized energy bills, etc. While the state, through the bantustan governments, 
has assumed responsibility for payment of these incentives, the DBSA has become 
increasingly involved in the funding of supportive infrastructure. (DBSA, 1985: 
31-33) . 
The shortcomings of the industrial decentralization programme have been 
extensively documented elsewhere (Dewar et al, 1985) and indicate that its impact on 
the development of the bantustans (and in particular its role in job creation) has 
been minimal. For example, the political misgivings of would-be industrialists 
aside, it has proven extremely difficult to overcome their prejudices with regard to 
relocation in economically peripheral regions. As a consequence, of those 
enterprises that have relocated in the bantustans, many have done so for short-term 
gain and profit solely from the exploitation of available incentives. In possible 
recognition of this fact, the Bank is displaying an increasing interest in the 
promotion of small business development in the bantustans. 
Notwithstanding this partial redirection, however, the policy of 
privatization has, to date, proved largely unsuccessful, and the annual report of 
the DBSA for 1984/85 was to lament 
As far as the private sector involvement is concerned, 
it became apparent that in addition to advising 
participating governments on steps to encourage and 
facilitate private sector involvement, there is also a 
clearly apparent need to change a persistent 
perception on the part of the private sector that 
development in the TBVC countries and the self 
governing national states is essentially a public 
sector responsibility. (DBSA, 1985: 5) 
Control and Redirection 
The role of the DBSA, according to its terms of reference, is principally 
(financially) supportive and (technically) advisory. Despite these claims, it is 
nevertheless certain that the Bank is performing an increasingly regulatory function 
in its dealings with the bantustans. The reasons for this are several: as a 
creation of the state, it "must pursue objectives derived from those of 
participating governments" (Brand, 1984 b: 85), that is, it must operate within the 
overall framework of existing government policy. At the same time, since it is 
purportedly an autonomous funding agency, it is optimally situated to oversee the 
implementation of development programmes which cohere with that policy. In that 
regard the present regionalization strategy would seem to dictate that the 
bantustans should become economically more viable, at least in their capacity to 
absorb existing and future work-seekers. This would appear to imply a greater 
commitment pn the part of the state to promote development in these regions. Linked 
to this, and perhaps of greater importance, however, has been an enduring fiscal 
crisis which has placed considerable pressure (via opposition parties) on the state, 
to ensure that funds allocated to the bantustans are expended judiciously and that 
the extravagances of earlier prestige projects are averted. 
The principal mechanism by which the DBSA is able to influence the course 
of development is by its insistence on strict adherence to a project cycle system as 
a prerequisite to the funding of any project. Through this process, an application 
for funding is appraised according to its suitability and, subsequently, its 
priority in terms of the development strategy of a particular region. If funding is 
approved, implementation is closely monitored and "in certain instances DBSA 
approval must be obtainedu (DBSA, 1984: 13) before implementing agencies may 
proceed. Thus, whereas in the past recourse was always to Pretoria to finance the 
development needs of the bantustans, under the existing system projects which fail 
to comply with the stipulations of the project cycle are simply not funded: 
(T)he capacity of participating states to identify, 
prepare and implement projects, and the initial lack 
of familiarity with the Bank's requirements and 
procedures, turned out to be significant constraints 
in many instances. (DBSA, 1985 B: 5) 
As a consequence of this, there is considerable pressure on bantustan 
administrations to adhere closely to the procedures of the Bank, and in particular 
to its prioritization of development needs: 
The Bank must always keep in mind that it was 
established not simply to dish out money but to help 
ensure that the best possible use is made of the 
available resources. For example, it should occur 
that a specific client submits a.project for 
development of industrial infrastructure on a scale 
which outstrips the need for such facilities in that 
specific area. The Bank's approach must be to give 
advice to that effect, but also to suggest more 
realistic alternatives - either more modest industrial 
facilities that would have a better chance of being 
fully utilized, or even a project in some other 
sector, such as agriculture, that might meet the same 
objectives in terms of employment and income 
generation. (Van der Kooy, 1985: 78) 
An added inducement to comply, moreover, is the fact that individual 
bantustans must compete against each other for the financial support of the Bank - 
the most compliant being those most likely to receive ready funding. At the same 
time, while it is indisputable that many of the wconstraintslw to the funding of the 
projects in the bantustans relate to administrative inability, it is also evident 
that the Bank's assistance in redressing these shortcomings will be directed towards 
the moulding of these administrations into more amenable forms, as is apparent from 
the following statement from a Bank report: 
It 5s therefore clear that the Bank will have to 
assist participating states more actively in 
developing the capacity of their development agencies 
to handle the project cycle activities efficiently and 
effectively. (DBSA, 1985 b: 5) 
At a macro level, the DBSA would appear to be poised to perform a central 
role in the implementation of a regional development strategy. Not only does it 
have observer status on the Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDACs), but it 
is also instrumental in efforts to plan development according to "rational" rather 
than political boundaries: 
Previously, economic planning was done according to 
economically unrealistic political borders. According 
to the new policy, planning would be carried out 
according to functional economic regions based on 
considerations of the economic structure within 
specific regions of Southern Africa. (Van der Kooy, 
1985: 52) 
Instances of this approach are evident in the proposed 
Queenstown/Ezibeleni/Ilinge structure plan - which traverses the Transkei/South 
Africa border - the Lebowa/Groblersdal joint water scheme, and the Lower Fish River 
Irrigation Project. Whilst it is still too soon to predict the outcome of this 
approach, it will inevitably facilitate a move towards confederation at the least. 
The piecemeal nature of this process, it would appear, is intended to avoid a direct 
challenge to the lfsovereigntyu of the independent bantustans (in particular) and, 
further, will avoid the prospect of alienating the support of their rulers. The 
marketing of reform, under the rubric of "developmentl~, is thus emerging as an 
important sphere of the Bank's activities. 
Reorientation of the Ideological Discourse 
Since the onset of the "Total Strategy" offensive in the late 1970s, the state has 
embarked on an extensive programme of legitimation, in its attempts to justify the 
restructuring of apartheid. In this endeavour, its efforts have been directed 
towards a reorientation of the ideological discourse of both the dominant class and 
the incipient Black bourgeoisie (the bantustan elite and the so-called "Black middle 
classH). This attempt to restore confidence amongst its adherents would seem to 
stem from the fact that, although the state and dominant class (or alliance of 
classes) share a broad interest in maintaining dominance over subordinate classes, 
the state has had (in response to crisis) to enforce concessions to subordinate 
class demands, at the apparent expense of the dominant class. The maintenance of 
cohesion amongst the ranks of the dominant classes in such a circumstance could, as 
Skocpol has pointed out, be construed as being of paramount importance to the 
survival of any state: 
(W)hat matters most is always the support or 
acquiescence not of the popular majority of society, 
but of the politically powerful and mobilised groups, 
invariably including the regimes own cadres. Loss of 
legitimacy, especially among these crucial groups, 
tends to ensue with a vengeance if and when ... the 
state fails consistently to cope with existing tasks, 
or proves unable to cope with new tasks suddenly 
thrust upon it by crisis circumstances. (Skocpol, 
1979: 32) 
Attempts to redefine the ideological discourse of the ruling class have 
taken various forms, but mostly have striven to redirect cognitive orientations away 
from the averred racism of "classical apartheid" towards a conception of 
CO-existence, co-operation and a common destiny. In this process, the issue of 
Black (and especially African) economic development has assumed increasing 
importance. 
Prior to the advent of the "Total Strategynt reforms, the generic term 
"developmenttt did not, per se, exist in official state lexicons. Up until that 
time, the socio-economic advancement of African people had been defined in terms of 
"bantu developmentIf , "separate developmenttf, Ifplural development1*, etc. Since then, 
however, there has been a concerted effort on the part of state ideologues, liberal' 
academics and others to generate an indigenous ttdevelopmenttt discourse within South 
Africa (Tapscott and Haines, 1983). The DBSA, from its inception, has been 
instrumental in this process. As Dr S S Brand, chief executive of the Bank, 
affirms, Itit is one of the responsibilities of the Bank to stimulate development 
research, and specifically applied development research relevant to Southern 
Africa1'. (Brand, 1984: 1) 
The DBSA, having taken over the functions and much of the staff of the 
parastatal Bureau for Economic Research re Black Development (BENSO), hitherto 
virtually the sole source of official data on the bantustans, has become a focal 
point for the propagation of "development thinkingw. Indicative of this has been 
its logistical support of the Development Society of Southern Africa, which emerged 
shortly after the commencement of Bank activities. The DBSAts journal, Development 
Southern Africa, has, for example, become the society's official journal. 
The Development Society, which has become perhaps the leading purveyor of 
Itdevelopment thinkingw, is explicit in its intent to foster Itunderstanding and 
co-operationn and to reorientate public opinion, as is evident in its constitutional 
objectives. 
To encourage, facilitate and support the creation and 
maintenance at the local, regional, national and 
international level of a framework within which 
individuals and organisations can debate development 
in the Southern African region. To promote dialogue, 
understanding and co-operation between all individuals 
and organisations committed to the development of 
everyone in the direction of greater justice and 
well-being for all. To advance knowledge on the . 
science, processes and art of development through 
educational means including the stimulation of 
research, publications and discussion and with full 
recognition of the multi-dimensionality of 
development. To stimulate an awareness of the 
challenge of development among the public at large and 
decision makers at all levels. (Development Society, 
1985) 
As in other dimensions of the Bank's activities, it would appear to be 
performing a dual function in promoting the development **debate1'. On the one hand, 
it is attempting, if not to justify, then at least to explain the apartheid policies 
that have preceded the present era of lldevelopmentlt and reform; on the other, it is 
attempting to prepare the ground for future policy changes. The present 
regionalization strategy is thus being presented as a corrective to the distortions 
arising from earlier programmes of economic growth, i.e. the modernization approach. 
Imbalances in the South African political economy are thus depicted as consequences 
of the dualism inherent in modernization. J A Lombard, at one time chief executive 
designate of the Bank, epitomizes this perspective: 
(T)he 1980's will probably have to deviate very 
substantially from the growth scenario of the 1960's. 
I think it may be accepted as a working hypothesis 
that the economic dualism of the South African social 
structure is, by almost general consensus, being 
phased out as expeditiously as may be done - 
considering all the strong traditional and statutory 
barriers upholding this dualism means that South 
Africa is moving towards a situation in which all 
South Africans can participate more fully in its 
economic processes. (Lombard, 1983: 228) 
The political and essentially technocratic nature of ltdevelopmentlt is
stressed throughout the DBSAts publications. It is evident, nevertheless, that this 
stance is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain: S S Brand, the Bank's chief 
executive, has, for example, on several occasions in recent months publicly 
questioned the "representativeness and legitimacy of national states governmentstt 
(Brand, 1948b: 95). Such a viewpoint is unlikely to be received favourably by 
bantustan leaders, and it is probable that the Bank will need to step up its efforts 
to encourage this elite to forgo a greater measure of its autonomy (via 
regionalization) in the interests of its longer term survival. In this process, the 
need for structural change will continue to be presented as a functionally rational 
response to impersonal economic forces. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this paper are of a preliminary nature and more extensive research 
is clearly indicated. Thus, for example, in locating the DBSA within the reform 
programme (and in particular as part of a regionalization strategy), it has not been 
the intention, heuristic imperatives aside, to project a purely functionalist image 
of the Bank, nor to suggest that its policies and actions are in every instance 
purposive or directed towards a concerted goal. The agenda of the DBSA, it is 
certain, is constantly mediated by a complex array of factors, including the 
changing political order, the state of the economy, and the contestation of Bank 
policy among constituent members and, not least, among members of the Bank's own 
staff. 
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